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Introduction and summary 
This note describes the macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy for 
the period 2019-2022, which are part of the projections for the euro area as a whole 
published by the ECB on 12 December.1 These projections incorporate the new 
information that has come to light since the publication of the previous projections 
on 24 September in Economic Bulletin 3/2019, and on 27 November.2 They also 
include for the first time the year 2022 in the projection horizon. 
The performance of the Spanish economy in the second half of 2019 has continued 
to be expansionary. It has sustained higher growth rates than those recorded in the 
euro area as a whole. In Q3, as in the previous quarter, GDP grew at a quarter-on-
quarter rate of 0.4% (compared with 0.2% in the euro area). The information available 
up to the cut-off date for this report suggests that, in Q4 to date, the pace of growth 
has remained similar. Looking ahead, the current projections foresee the present 
expansionary phase continuing over the next three years. Growth will continue to be 
underpinned by the improvements over recent years in the financial position of 
households and firms. This will provide key support for the buoyancy of domestic 
demand. A second underpinning is the ECB’s accommodative monetary policy 
stance, which has been strengthened following the measures adopted by the 
Governing Council in September. That will in turn be conducive to continuing easy 
financial conditions. As to external demand, the assumptions anchoring the 
projections in this report consider that, following the recent weakening in exports 
and in the absence of fresh adverse developments, export markets will tend to 
gradually pick up throughout the projection horizon. Accordingly, in the coming 
years the Spanish economy’s growth rate is expected to continue outpacing the rate 
of potential growth and, as a result, the positive output gap stemming from the 
prolongation of the current upturn will continue widening. That will enable the still-
high level of unemployment to carry on being reabsorbed. 
In any event, as has been the case since mid-2017, GDP growth is forecast to 
continue moving on a gradually slowing path over the projection horizon. Hence, in 
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1  See the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, December 2019.
2   Specifically, compared with the Macroeconomic projections for Spain (2019-2021), published as Box 1 in 
the  “Quarterly  report  on  the  Spanish  economy”,  in  Economic Bulletin 3/2019, the current projections 
include the changes observed between 17 September and 19 November in the technical assumptions, in 
the  budgetary  assumptions  and  in  the  projections  for  the  Spanish  economy’s  external  setting.  The 
projections further include the Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) preliminary estimates for 2019 Q3. 
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average annual terms, the GDP growth rate is expected to stand at 2% in 2019, 
down on the figure of 2.4% posted in 2018, and to ease to 1.7%, 1.6% and 1.5% in 
each of the three following years (see Chart 1 and Table 1). This slowdown, which 
would be consistent with gradual convergence by the economy’s growth rate to its 
potential growth rate, is due to smaller contributions by external and domestic 
demand alike to output growth. As regards the contribution of external demand to 
GDP growth, which is estimated to have been slightly positive in 2019, this will 
diminish as a result of a projected sharper increase in imports than in that of exports. 
Despite the relative strength of domestic demand, this variable is expected to lose 
momentum in the coming years. In this respect, the latest National Accounts data on 
private consumption, along with some weakening in the flows of new lending granted 
to households to finance their spending on goods and services, appear to suggest 
the end of the process involving the absorption of the demand for durable goods 
built up during the crisis, which would also curb the future buoyancy of this demand 
component. Moreover, the rebound in the household saving rate from its early 2018 
low seems to be reflecting a more cautious attitude of these agents in their spending 
decisions. The projected easing in consumption is likewise grounded in the slowdown 
recently witnessed in job creation. Furthermore, the diminished buoyancy of final 
demand suggests that business investment will also hold at a more moderate rate of 
expansion than that posted in recent years. 
As regards inflation, the average annual Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP) growth rate is expected to move on a rising course over the projection horizon. 
This path reflects the expected behaviour for the core component (i.e. the HICP 
excluding food and energy goods), the gradual rise in which will be the outcome of 
GROWTH AND INFLATION OUTLOOK FOR SPAIN
Chart 1
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
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the progressive widening of the positive output gap caused by the prolongation of 
the upturn and by the consequent gradual decline that the unemployment rate will 
continue to experience. The upshot of this will be a degree of dynamism in unit 
labour costs. The expansionary monetary policy stance (and, in particular, the policy 
measures recently adopted) will also contribute to the rising trajectory of core 
inflation. In terms of the overall indicator, also reinforcing this expected path will be 
the projected course of oil prices on futures markets, with increasingly smaller 
percentage declines as the projection horizon unfolds. The outcome of all these 
factors will see the growth of the overall HICP, in average annual terms, increase 
gradually from 0.8% in 2019 to 1.6% in 2022, with core inflation rising from 1.1% to 
1.7% over the same period. 
Compared with the September projections, GDP growth holds unchanged over the 
projection horizon. This is as a result of several factors which, taken individually, 
have a very modest impact on the projections and whose net effect is approximately 
zero, since they offset one another. On one hand, the assumptions underpinning the 
PROJECTIONS FOR THE MAIN MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a)
Table 1
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
NOTE: Latest QNA figure published: 2019 Q3.
a Projections cut-off date: 19 November 2019.
b Includes machinery, capital goods, weapons systems, cultivated biological resources and intellectual property products.
Differences between current
and September 2019 projections
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2019 2020 2021
0.00.00.05.16.17.10.24.2PDG
0.03.02.03.14.16.12.18.1noitpmusnoc etavirP
3.04.04.04.15.17.12.29.1noitpmusnoc tnemnrevoG
0.01.0-5.09.15.23.37.23.5noitamrof latipac dexif ssorG
    Investment in equipment, intangibles and other (b) 4.1 4.1 4.9 2.3 1.7 1.8 2.0 0.0
1.0-3.2-9.0-1.28.26.14.16.6noitcurtsnoc ni tnemtsevnI    
4.0-6.0-4.0-9.29.23.28.12.2secivres dna sdoog fo stropxE
3.0-1.05.00.32.33.30.13.3secivres dna sdoog fo stropmI
National demand (contribution to growth) 2.7 1.7 1.9 1.6 1.5 0.3 0.2 0.1
Net external demand (contribution to growth) -0.3 0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1
Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) 1.7 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.6 0.0 0.1 -0.1
1.0-0.00.07.15.14.11.10.1doof dna ygrene gnidulcxe PCIH
1.0-0.02.02.14.13.10.25.2)sboj tnelaviuqe emit-lluf( tnemyolpmE
Unemployment rate (% of labour force).
End-of-period data 14.4 14.3 13.6 13.0 12.5 0.2 0.4 0.2
Unemployment rate (% of labour force).
Annual average 15.3 14.2 13.8 13.1 12.6 0.1 0.2 0.1
General government net lending (+)/net borrowing (–) 
(% of GDP) -2.5 -2.5 -2.1 -1.8 -1.4 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3
December 2019 projections
Annual rate of change in volume terms and % of GDP
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current projections, described in Box 1, are on the whole somewhat less conducive 
to dynamic activity than those in September. In particular, despite the fact that a 
gradual recovery is projected for export markets, this pick-up will be less robust 
than that expected three months ago. This relative downturn in performance will be 
partly offset by the expansionary effect on activity stemming from lower oil prices. 
On the other hand, the latest data suggest the GDP growth path will stabilise in the 
second half of the year, in contrast to the weakening augured by the conjunctural 
information available at the time the September projections report was drafted. In 
any event, although the GDP growth path remains unaltered in the new projections 
as a result of these counteracting developments, the composition of GDP growth 
has been slightly revised. This is chiefly as a consequence of the incorporation of the 
Q3 National Accounts data. Specifically, an increase in the contribution of domestic 
demand to output growth and a reduction of the same order in that corresponding 
to the external component are now projected. 
The projections relating to the HICP are practically unchanged on those published 
three months earlier, regarding both the overall and the core indicators. The small 
scale of the revisions is consistent first, with the absence of inflation surprises in 
recent months; and further, with the scant changes both in the assumptions on 
which the projections are based and in the outlook for activity and the labour market. 
Activity and employment 
From the standpoint of the composition of aggregate demand, output growth will 
continue to be underpinned largely by the buoyancy of private domestic spending, 
whose contribution to GDP growth will, in any event, be smaller than in recent years. 
The contribution of net external demand to the expansion of output will, after having 
been positive in 2019, turn slightly negative in 2020 and stand at practically zero in 
the following two years.3
The favourable trajectory of private national demand will continue to be assisted by 
the persistence of propitious financial conditions and by the improvements witnessed 
during the current expansionary phase in the financial position of households and 
firms. Household spending on consumption and investment will be further spurred 
by the expansionary behaviour of household income and, in particular, by the 
3   The negative contribution of net external demand  in 2020 will  be  the outcome of  the carry-over effect 
associated with its high negative value in 2019 Q3. For an analysis of the so-called carry-over effect (and, 
in general, of how the average annual course of a variable  is explained by developments  in the various 
quarters of the preceding and of the current year), see González Mínguez, J. and C. Martínez Carrascal 
(2019), “The relationship between average annual and quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rates: implications 
for projections and macroeconomic analysis”. Banco de España, Economic Bulletin, 2019/3.
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prolongation of the positive course of employment. Private consumption will, 
however, be somewhat less buoyant in the future than in previous years owing to the 
confluence of several factors. Firstly, the increase in household labour income is 
expected to rest progressively more in the coming years on the recovery in real 
wages and less on net job creation. This composition of labour income growth will 
be less conducive to increases in consumption than in previous years, given that the 
marginal propensity to spend tends to be lower when the rise in labour income 
stems from higher wages than when its origin lies in an increase in employment.4 
Secondly, there is the decline in spending on durable goods observable, according 
to the National Accounts, since mid-2018. This suggests that the process whereby 
the pent-up demand for such goods that built up during the crisis has progressively 
been met in recent years is close to completion.5 Thirdly, in a setting in which 
numerous sources of uncertainty persist, the household saving rate is expected to 
increase moderately over the projection horizon, drawing close to its historical 
average. These dynamics would be consistent with the rise already observed in this 
variable since early 2018 and with the recent worsening of certain consumer 
sentiment indicators. Compared with the September projections, the expected path 
of household spending on goods and services has been revised upwards in the 
short term. This is as a result of the incorporation of the latest National Accounts 
information, with a positive surprise that entails a significant carry-over effect.6
Residential investment slowed notably in 2019, after posting very high growth rates 
in the initial years of the recovery starting from the low level reached due to the 
crisis. Over the projection horizon this aggregate is expected to expand at rates 
similar to those recently observed. Compared with the September projections, the 
pace of growth envisaged for this demand component is now more moderate, 
especially in the 2019-2020 period. This is due to the (more favourable than expected) 
course of the National Accounts variable in Q3, and to its less expansionary future 
behaviour predicted by the high-frequency indicators. These developments might 
be partly associated with transitory reasons, although the presence of other, more 
persistent factors that might likewise subtract further momentum from this demand 
component cannot be ruled out. The moderation in the buoyancy of housing 
investment, combined with the projected rise in the saving rate, would lead to a 
modest increase in household net lending capacity to somewhat above 1% of GDP. 
The outlook for an expansion in activity and the headway made in redressing firms’ 
financial position will continue to be conducive to business investment growth. In 
any event, in step with the projected lower momentum of final demand, and against 
4  See Chapter 2 of the Annual Report, 2015, Banco de España.
5   For an analysis of recent developments in consumption by type of spending (and in terms of the changes 
in    labour  market  status  of  household  members),  see  “The  relationship  between  the  behaviour  of 
consumption and employment during the recovery”, Banco de España, Economic Bulletin, 2019/4.
6   See, once more, González Mínguez, J. and C. Martínez Carrascal (2019), op. cit.
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a background of uncertainty, business investment is also expected to increase at a 
lesser pace than in recent years. The sizeable upward surprise in the growth of this 
aggregate in Q3 will in any case give rise to a significant carry-over effect, leading to 
current expectations of growth rates in the 2019-2020 period greater than those 
projected in September. Partly countering this revision, however, are the effects of 
the updated assumptions of the projections exercise (and, in particular, the outlook 
for flatter export markets). 
On the external front, sales to the rest of the world will gradually increase over the 
forecasting horizon, in line with the projected recovery in export markets. In any 
event, the average growth of exports has been revised downwards relative to the 
forecasts three months ago. For one thing, this revision is due to the incorporation 
of more recent data, which show a less favourable performance by this aggregate 
(concentrated under the capital and intermediate goods headings) in Q3 this year 
than was anticipated three months ago. For another, the expected diminished 
robustness of exports is also due to the less dynamic behaviour foreseen for Spain’s 
external markets. 
The projections on imports point to their elasticity to final demand drawing gradually 
but only partly closer to its historical mean. Elasticity will thus remain below this 
mean at the end of the projection horizon. This is attributable, on one hand, to the 
observation globally that the increase in world trade per unit of GDP growth is lower 
post-crisis than pre-crisis. And, on the other, to the assumption that the recent, 
unusually low growth of Spanish imports cannot be attributed in full to the composition 
of final demand or to a possible import substitution process following the competitive 
adjustment in the economy. Accordingly, it is estimated that a transitory component 
must also be at play. The projected increase in imports is now, compared with what 
was expected three months ago, somewhat higher in 2019 and 2020 and somewhat 
lower in 2021. This pattern of import revisions reflects both the impact of the latest 
National Accounts data for this aggregate and the changes to the projected paths 
for the various final demand components (particularly for gross fixed capital formation 
and exports, which have a high import content), over the entire course of the 
projection horizon. 
As regards employment, the gradual moderation in output growth rates which is 
anticipated over the projection horizon will translate into a progressive reduction in 
the pace of job creation compared with that observed in recent years. The latest 
labour market indicators are consistent with this progressive slowdown. In any event, 
the increase in employment will enable the unemployment rate to continue falling, 
albeit at a lesser pace than that observed in previous years. This slowdown in the 
declining path of unemployment reflects both the lower pace of job creation and a 
modest rise in the rate of increase of the labour force. Compared with the September 
projections, the expected reduction in the unemployment rate is now somewhat less 
pronounced. This is due to the fact that the recent behaviour of the labour force has 
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been somewhat more dynamic than was then projected. In 2022 on average, the 
unemployment rate is expected to stand at 12.6% of the labour force. 
The budget deficit will gradually be corrected over the projection horizon, being 
estimated to stand at 1.4% of GDP in 2022. However, this improvement would rest 
exclusively on the favourable effects of the economic cycle and on the continuation 
of the ongoing reduction in the average cost of debt, as a result of the current low 
interest rate environment. Conversely, under the assumptions of the projections 
exercise, no significant changes are expected in the primary structural balance over 
the projection horizon. Consequently, the fiscal policy stance, which had been 
clearly expansionary in 2019, would be approximately neutral in the 2020-2022 
period. Compared with the projections three months ago, the current forecasts 
entail an upward revision of the budget deficit. This is of the order of 0.1 pp in 2019, 
further to the incorporation of the latest available information7, and of an additional 
0.2 pp in 2020 and 2021, due largely to the fact that the fiscal assumptions on which 
these projections are based include a revision of the assumption on the revaluation 
of pensions8. 
Prices and costs 
The expected growth of compensation per employee in each of the projection horizon 
years fluctuates around 2%, which exceeds the rate seen from the onset of recovery 
until 2018. The factors behind this more dynamic behaviour of wages include a lower 
unemployment rate and, in 2019 and 2020, the application of the recommendations 
made in the Acuerdo para el Empleo y la Negociación Colectiva (Employment and 
Collective Bargaining Agreement).9 Furthermore, the increase in labour costs in 2019 
also reflects the rises in the national minimum wage and in the maximum contribution 
base. Against a background in which productivity growth will continue to be low, the 
faster growth of compensation per employee will lead to unit labour costs increasing 
more steeply than in recent years. Meanwhile, the external component of price 
formation, measured by the imports deflator, will grow somewhat more slowly than in 
7   Specifically, for 2019, the budget outturn figures to September for overall general government, excluding 
local government, show a more dynamic than expected increase in employee compensation and in welfare 
benefits. Along these same lines, the October figures for tax revenue  indicate a significant slowdown in 
revenue raised from corporation tax, since the high advance payments observed in 2018 have not been 
repeated this year. 
8   In particular, the current projections assume an increase in pensions in line with the CPI for the 2020-2022 
period, set against the 0.25% revaluation – the outcome of the formula laid down in the 2013 legislation 
being applied – that was assumed in the September projections exercise.
9   The agreement establishes, as a reference, annual wage rises between 2% and 3% in the three years it is 
in force. This rise is made up of a 2% fixed portion and a 1% variable portion linked to variables such as 
productivity, business profits and absenteeism.
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recent years owing to the projected decline in oil prices, according to the assumptions 
made in the exercise, in contrast to the increase in the 2017-2018 period.
After moderating significantly in 2019, dominated by the behaviour of the energy 
component, the growth of the consumer price index (CPI) is projected to quicken 
progressively, rising from 0.8% in 2019 to 1.6% in 2022. Also, core inflation — measured 
by the rate of change of the index which excludes energy and food — will foreseeably 
rise gradually (from 1.1% in 2018 to 1.7% in 2022), reflecting the behaviour of unit 
labour costs and a widening output gap.
Risks 
The risks to the baseline scenario for GDP growth remain predominantly on the 
downside. These risks stem mainly from the external environment of the Spanish 
economy, whose behaviour since the beginning of 2018 has been characterised by 
persistently negative surprises in the growth rate of global activity and, in particular, 
by rates of expansion of world trade which, given the output growth, been very low. 
In the current projection exercise, this behaviour has, as in previous exercises, led to 
a downward revision of the growth rate of Spain’s export markets. However, despite 
the recent signs of stabilisation of activity and world trade, we cannot rule out further 
downside surprises which may threaten the external market recovery projected 
under the baseline scenario. In particular, this scenario relies on the assumptions 
that global trade tensions will tend to dissipate in the coming quarters and that 
Brexit will be orderly. The non-materialisation of these assumptions or a hypothetical 
resurgence of geopolitical tensions in some regions (such as the Middle East and 
Latin America) may ultimately impinge negatively on export activity and business 
investment in Spain.
On the domestic front, uncertainty persists about the future design of economic 
policies and, in particular, about the elements needed to resume the process of 
fiscal consolidation, insofar as a new government has yet to be formed after the 
recent general elections. Similarly, Spain’s resilience to hypothetical adverse 
developments would be strengthened by the adoption of a programme of structural 
reforms to boost economic growth potential.
With regard to inflation, the risks of departure from the baseline scenario are also on 
the downside and arise mainly from a possible materialisation of the risks to activity 
described above. Also, the prospect that core inflation may rise during the projection 
horizon is conditional upon the degree of price sensitivity to the cyclical improvement 
in activity, a factor subject to considerable uncertainty.
16.12.2019.
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Box 1
ASSUMPTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF PROJECTIONS
The assumptions on the paths of interest and exchange 
rates and of oil and other commodity prices are based on 
the prices quoted on the respective markets during the 
ten business days prior to the cut-off date (19 November). 
Specifically, in accordance with this methodology, the oil 
price is expected to average $63.8 per barrel in 2019 and 
to then fall by nearly 11% in cumulative terms over the 
following three years, to $56.8 per barrel in 2022. 
Compared with the previous forecasts, this oil price 
trajectory entails a small downward revision (of 0.2% in 
2019 and 0.4% in each of the following two years).
As regards interest rates, on average, 3-month EURIBOR 
in the period 2019-2021 is expected to be around -0.4%, 
rising slightly in 2022 to -0.3%. For their part, Spanish 
10-year government debt yields are forecast to fall in 2020 
to 0.5%, 0.7 pp less than the 2019 average, and to rise by 
0.2 pp in each of the following two years, up to 0.9% in 
2022. This entails a slightly upward revision for both 
references for the period 2020-2021 (0.1 pp in each year). 
In line with this projection, the cost of credit to households 
and firms has also seen a modest upward revision 
(between 0.1 pp and 0.2 pp) for the two-year period. 
The nominal effective exchange rate of the euro is lower in 
2019 and 2020 than in the previous projection exercise 
and no significant changes are expected for 2021. The 
assumptions on the euro/dollar exchange rate are 
unchanged on three months earlier.
The projections for economic activity and imports in the 
main geographical areas with which Spain trades are now 
less favourable than in the September projections, 
especially for 2020. This has given rise to a downward 
revision of the growth forecast for Spain’s export markets, 
which are expected to grow by 1.8% in 2019, followed by 
a gradual increase, up to 2.7% in 2022.
The budgetary policy assumptions include, as in the 
September projection exercise, extension for 2019 of the 
State and Social Security Budget for 2018, the measures 
approved by Congress before the general election in April, 
the regional and local government budgets approved for 
the year and the latest information available on budget 
outturn. The assumptions for the rest of the projection 
horizon considered envisage that at 31 December 2019 
the 2018 Budget will be extended, for the second year in 
SOURCES: Banco de España and ECB.
a Cut-off date for assumptions: 19 November 2019. Figures expressed as levels are annual averages. Figures expressed as rates are calculated based 
on the relevant annual averages.
b Differences between rates for world output and export markets and between levels for oil prices and the dollar/euro exchange rate. Percentage 
differences for the effective nominal exchange rate and percentage point differences for interest rates.
c A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
d For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared using the Eurosystem's methodology. These assumptions are 
based on futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the course of these variables.
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2019 2020 2021
International environment
1.0-3.0-1.0-1.31.39.27.26.3PDG dlroW    
4.0-6.0-1.0-7.25.29.18.12.3stekram tropxe s'niapS    
4.0-4.0-2.0-8.654.756.958.361.17)level( lerrab/rallod SU ni ecirp liO    
Monetary and financial conditions
00.000.000.001.101.101.121.181.1)level( etar egnahcxe orue/rallod SU    
    Nominal effective exchange rate against non-euro area (c)
    (2000 = 100 and percentage differences) 121.5 116.4 114.8 114.8 114.8 0.0 -0.3 -0.3
1.01.00.03.0-4.0-4.0-4.0-3.0-)d( )ROBIRUE htnom-3( etar tseretni mret-trohS    
1.01.00.09.07.05.07.04.1 )d( )dleiy dnob raey-01( etar tseretni mret-gnoL    
Difference between current 
and September 2019 
projections (b)
December 2019 projections
Table 1
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (a)
Annual rates of change unless otherwise indicated
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Box 1
ASSUMPTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF PROJECTIONS (cont’d)
a row, this time for 2020, given the difficulties that the 
legal time limits for formation of a new government after 
the November general election entail for presentation of 
the draft budget before year-end. Moreover, by contrast 
to the assumptions made in the previous forecasting 
exercises, in these projections it is assumed that pensions 
will be indexed to CPI growth in the period 2020-2022, 
given that the various political forces appear to share the 
same criteria in this respect.1 Regarding all the other 
assumptions, first, it is assumed that the more discretionary 
budget items – particularly public investment and 
procurement, on account of their size – will evolve in line 
with the potential growth of the economy. Second, in the 
absence of other measures, it is considered that the 
trajectory of the other headings of the general government 
accounts will be governed by their usual determinants. 
Specifically it is assumed that public revenue will grow in 
line with tax bases, which mainly depend on the 
macroeconomic environment. Similar assumptions are 
made for less discretionary expenditure items. This is the 
case of unemployment benefits (which mainly depend on 
how unemployment evolves) and interest payments 
(which are determined by changes in government debt 
levels and interest rates). 
In accordance with these assumptions and projections for 
the budgetary policy variables, and bearing in mind the 
output gap estimated in this projection exercise, the 
budgetary policy stance in Spain would be expansionary 
in 2019, before turning neutral in the following three years.2
1   On 15 October, in accordance with the European Semester schedule, the government sent the draft budgetary plan for 2020 to the 
European Commission. This plan is based on the assumption of no new measures, with two exceptions: the increase in public sector 
wages for 2020 that was agreed with the unions in 2018 is maintained, and pension indexation to the CPI is introduced.
2   Measuring structural balances in the recent period is hampered by the effect of certain one-off measures affecting 2018 and 2019. 
These include, in particular, those linked to the cost of the insolvent motorway companies, to the asset protection schemes and 
deferred tax assets of the banking sector, and to the court ruling stipulating that maternity and paternity benefits are exempt from 
personal income tax. These measures would be equivalent to 0.4% of GDP in 2018 and to 0.3% of GDP in 2019.
